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Neoliberalism, consultants and the privatisation of public policy 






This paper identifies the importance of private advisers, particularly consultants, in 
promoting neoliberal prescriptions in public policy formulation in the recent history of 
British Government. It examines a consultant-dominated attempt to reform British Rail in 
the 1980s and the fundamental contribution of advisers to the flawed fragmentation and 
subsequent privatisation of the rail industry. Concepts drawn from Latour’s Sociology of 
Translation are adopted to examine the attempts by Conservative Governments and their 
private advisory allies to establish networks of support for privatisation. In each of the 
episodes along the path to privatisation the paper examines attempts to undermine 
opposition and gain acceptance of the proposed changes with the production of 
knowledge claims by consultants, that is Latour’s process of purification, followed by the 
consequences for the rail industry. The paper uses critical financial analysis to contrast 
the knowledge claims made by consultants with the outcomes of rail privatisation, which 
include extensive, ongoing transfers from taxpayers to private companies. It concludes by 
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Neoliberalism, consultants and the privatisation of public policy 
formulation: The case of Britain’s rail industry 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the striking features of public policy over the past few decades has been 
the “emphatic turn towards neoliberalism”, in countries such as Britain and the USA, and 
the restructuring of the public sector through the adoption of policies which have 
emphasised deregulation and privatisation (Harvey, 2007, pp. 2-3). For three decades 
after 1945 in liberal democratic states there had been a postwar consensus about the role 
and importance of the public sector, most notably Britain. Britain’s Labour Governments 
of 1945-51 brought within the public sector important industries such as coal, steel, gas 
and electricity and rail and established the welfare state. In the face of market failures 
arising from inadequate investment by, for example, private rail companies, public 
enterprise was promoted as the way to develop an efficient industry which would benefit 
British capital and society.  
The post-war consensus over the state’s responsibility for providing core public 
services came under sustained attack from neoliberals in the 1970s as economies 
experienced rapid inflation simultaneously with faltering or negative economic growth, a 
phenomenon referred to as stagflation. Two important political beneficiaries of these 
economic changes were Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the US, both 
of whom subscribed to the neoliberal New Right Agenda and highlighted the need to 
reduce state provision of services and state ownership in order to promote private 
ownership and encourage entrepreneurial freedom. Government was identified as “the 
problem” not “the solution” (Reagan, 1981; cited by McSweeney (2009, p.839)). 
 3 
Margaret Thatcher concurred, but took a more overtly ideological approach than Ronald 
Reagan, even declaring Messianically that while “economics are the method”, the “object 
is to change the soul” (Harvey, 2007, p. 23). Although their rhetoric varied, both leaders 
“took what had hitherto been minority political, ideological, and intellectual positions and  
made them mainstream” (Harvey, 2007, p. 62).    
In Britain, the Conservative Governments of the 1980s led by Margaret Thatcher 
gradually developed a wide-ranging privatisation programme. Nationalised monopoly 
utilities such as gas, water and electricity were sold into private ownership through share 
flotations. Various motives lay behind the privatisation policy. Early debate was 
dominated by economic arguments about promoting efficiency through private ownership 
and market disciplines (Flemming & Mayer, 1997; Goodman & Loveman, 1991; Letza et 
al., 2004; Ogden, 1997; Shaoul, 1997). Later arguments focused on privatisation’s role in 
reducing the role of government and raising revenue to reduce public sector borrowing 
(Letza et al., 2004; Ogden, 1997; Shaoul, 1997). Economic models and efficiency 
arguments were used to legitimise privatisations but, according to Shaoul (1997, p. 479), 
the ultimate result in each case was to benefit capitalism by “transferring wealth from the 
public at large to a relatively few individuals and corporate entities” in the private sector. 
Public policy in Britain and other advanced capitalist countries became dominated by the 
neoliberal agenda that has sought to fully privatise state owned enterprises, or to transfer 
activities to the private sector through various public-private partnerships (Edwards and 
Shaoul, 2003, p. 397). Following privatisation and public management reforms, a “third 
wave” of neoliberalisation reforms arose where members of central governments and 
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public servants “increasingly think and behave like entrepreneurs” (Morales et al., 2014, 
p. 426). 
This paper focuses on rail privatisation which has three unique features: it was the 
most complex privatisation undertaken by the Conservatives; it was followed by a 
continuing wealth transfer to the private sector through increased subsidy and, as a senior 
manager in the industry argued, it was unique in “that the nature of the new structure was 
not decided by the experts working within the industry but by people from outside such 
as consultants …” (Green, cited in Wolmar, 2005, p. 58). Informed by concepts drawn 
from Latour’s Sociology of Translation (Actor-Network Theory), the paper focuses on 
the knowledge claims provided by consultants and advisers in the formulation of public 
policy related to the reform and privatisation of Britain’s rail industry. This paper 
responds to the need, highlighted by Christensen and Skaerbaek (2010, p. 543), for 
“further longitudinal study of cases” where consultancy outputs, often co-produced with 
the client, are influential in delivering controversial accounting changes in public sector 
organisations. It also answers Cooper and Robson’s (2006, p. 434) call for studies of how 
“the translation of multiple issues to ‘accounting issues’ now gives enormous influence to 
accounting firms in … economic and political life”. Hence, the analysis focuses on a 
consultant-dominated attempt to reform Britain’s nationalised rail industry in the 1980s, 
and the subsequent fundamental contribution of consultants to the fragmentation and 
privatisation of the rail industry in the 1990s. The analysis is longitudinal, examining the 
two key phases of public policy towards Britain’s rail industry, and highlights the crucial 
influence of consultants in formulating and implementing public policy.  
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Consultants and advisers, drawn predominantly from the large accountancy firms, 
became key figures in the “neo-liberal alliance” that implemented privatisation (Martin, 
1993, p. 6) through the transformation of contested values and claims. The advisory role 
of consultants, particularly accountants, was not simply “technical”, for privatisation 
advice most importantly “becomes intertwined with economic and public policy 
decisions” (Arnold and Cooper, 1999, p. 133). Privatisation consultants play a strategic 
policy role advising, for example, on the need for neoliberal reforms to create an 
“enabling environment” for privatisation, and the necessity for pre-privatisation 
restructuring (Arnold and Cooper, 1999, p. 133). Economic and political factors were 
both important in the increasingly influential role gained by consultants. In the 1980s, 
there was a major change in the nature of accountancy work. Once the market for 
traditional audit services became full to capacity firms provided new services to increase 
revenue, the bulk of which came from providing consulting services (Suddaby et al., 
2007, p. 340). In Britain, auditing fees now comprise under 40% of the revenue of the 
large accounting firms, compared to 70% in 1980 (Smith, 2012, p. 9).       
Political factors were also important in creating a market for private sector 
advisory services (Arnold and Cooper, 1999, p. 135). Governments regarded private 
consultants as more likely to be sympathetic to the goal of privatisation than civil 
servants, thereby allowing governments to avoid the possibility that privatisation 
programmes might be undermined by opposition within state bureaucracies (Arnold and 
Cooper, 1999, p. 135). Further, the State was keen to use accounting’s professional status 
to bring “an appearance of legitimacy and technical correctness” to privatisation, in order 
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to reassure a public “concerned about the corruptive influences of market capitalism” 
(Arnold and Cooper, 1999, p. 134).  
Although governments in Britain have increasingly resorted to using consultants 
there have been several highly critical reports on this process. Two National Audit Office 
(NAO) reports (2001, 2006) criticised the amounts spent on consultants, which averaged 
over £1 billion per year, and cast doubt on the extent to which value for money is 
obtained.. (see Appendix A for a list of all abbreviations used). The Select Committee on 
Public Accounts later concurred, arguing that government departments have a “poor 
understanding of what value they obtain” from consultants; they also criticised the 
dependency of some departments on consultants as “unacceptable” (Public Accounts 
Committee, 2010, paras. 1, 2, p. 5). The Transport Department, in particular, was 
criticised for spending £70 on consultants for every £100 spent on its own staff (Public 
Accounts Committee, 2010, para. 2, p. 5). 
The use of consultants in the public sector has also been the subject of a range of  
critical academic papers. One critical study argued that consultants presented “phantom 
images” of idealised public sector accounting, based on the adoption of accrual 
accounting, and so “became an essential ingredient in public sector accounting change” 
(Christensen, 2005, pp. 447-448). Another paper examined the work of consultants in 
Britain’s National Health Service, arguing that they were “intellectual mercenaries”, 
providing market-orientated views which appear to have been employed “to provide 
legitimation” for a drive to “downsize” acute care (Leys, 1999, p. 447). An analysis of a 
consultancy based project to introduce a financial management initiative into the 
Probation Service provided “a vivid illustration of the difficulty of applying the 
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traditional management accounting principles” in the public sector (Humphrey, 1994, p. 
171).  A more positive view of consultants working in the public sector, using interview 
evidence, was provided by Lapsley and Oldfield (2001, pp. 540-541) who acquitted them 
of being “witchdoctors” and found they possessed relevant skills used to deliver some 
changes in the public sector. An historical study of the development of management 
consultancy across three countries found that Britain, and to a lesser extent Canada, has 
been more likely than France to give rise to a “consultocracy” as public sector reforms 
were implemented, because in the first two countries “management consultancy emerged 
earlier and is more strongly developed than in France” (Saint-Martin, 1998, p. 322).  
This study contributes to the literature on consultants by providing a 
comprehensive critique of their role in influencing policy concerning Britain’s rail 
industry, highlighting the dominance of neoliberal ideology. The key research question is 
how consultants were able to exercise influence on public policy formulation to the extent  
that their knowledge claims, drawn from neoliberal ideology, formed the basis for the 
1992 rail privatisation  White Paper New opportunities for the railways (Department of 
Transport, 1992) and the subsequent fragmentation and then privatisation of the rail 
network. 
The next section of the paper explains the paper’s methodology and the key 
theoretical concepts, most especially Latour’s ideas of translation and purification, which 
inform the paper. The third section examines the rise of neoliberal ideology, which 
framed the rhetoric of knowledge claims in the debates on rail. The fourth section 
analyses the establishment and role of the Serpell Committee, highlighting the influence 
of consultants on its attempt to purify British Rail’s finances in the 1980s. This is 
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followed by an examination of the purification attempts by which consultants provided 
knowledge claims, based on neoliberal ideology, to support the contested fragmentation 
model of rail privatisation which was introduced in the 1992 White Paper. Purification is 
where processes are adopted “that progress ideas toward acceptance” (Christensen and 
Skaerbaek, 2010, pp. 525). It operates by transforming opinions or statements into what 
are meant to appear to be hard facts which can provide an effective rhetorical strategy 
(Berglund and Werr, 2000, p. 652). The four key knowledge claims provided by 
consultants for the privatisation of British Rail are then contrasted in the sixth section 
with the outcomes of rail privatisation by analysing the impact of privatisation on 
infrastructure investment, costs and government subsidy, safety and quality of service. 
The final section provides a discussion and conclusions on the implications of the 
contested privatisation for public policy formulation.  
 
2. Methodology and Theoretical Insights  
 The key primary sources for this study of the proposed reform of British Rail and 
then later its fragmentation and full privatisation were files in The National Archive 
(TNA) at Kew, London. Documents contained in the files were of three main types. 
Firstly, there were those which were communications between British Rail, consultants 
and politicians which provide details of discussions and decisions related to the Serpell 
Committee on Railway Finances (1983), which was established to examine critically and 
make recommendations on British Rail’s costs and whose work is analysed in section 4.2. 
The documents include the process by which consultants were appointed and the impact 
of their work on the Serpell Committee Report (1983). Most important for the purposes 
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of this study were the papers provided by the consultants which examined the then 
current position of British Rail, with the focus on operational features which impacted on 
costs and financial performance. In order to analyse the influence of consultants on the 
proposed radical reform of British Rail which was recommended by the Serpell 
Committee, all of the 41 files of working papers supporting the Committee’s Report were 
examined. The working papers were grouped into five main categories: British Rail’s 
evidence; Conservative Government evidence; British Rail supporters’ evidence, 
including rail unions and pressure groups; consultants’ reports and background papers, 
including correspondence. Examination of the working papers enabled the influence of 
the consultants on the final Report to be identified. Given the close relationship between  
members of the Serpell Committee and the consulting firms contracted by the 
government, references to the potential for conflicts of interest were a priority in the 
examination of the documents.  
      For the privatisation of British Rail, the TNA’s website was examined to identify 
the third type of important file; files held on rail privatisation, which numbered over 
1,200. Although some of these files are still withheld under the 30-year confidentiality 
rule for government papers it was possible to access sufficient files which have been 
released early to obtain three major consultancy reports prepared for the Conservative 
Governments responsible for rail privatisation. Additionally, files provided information 
on other consultancy work undertaken for the government, a major consultancy report 
prepared for British Rail, and British Rail’s unsuccessful attempts to lobby ministers 
against the fragmented model advocated by the privatisation networks which would see 
the various components of the British railway network separated and sold to potentially 
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many firms. The files were used to capture how the consultants created a discourse which 
supported the chosen fragmented privatisation model, and the extent to which their 
neoliberal arguments provided the foundations for the 1992 privatisation White Paper.   
       The paper also draws on other primary sources, including reports from think 
tanks, parliamentary debates, parliamentary Select Committee reports, and company 
accounts. Think tank reports were important in contributing to the development of the 
fragmented privatisation model. Parliamentary debates on the Serpell Committee 
highlighted opposition both to its recommendations on British Rail’s finances and to the 
conflict of interest arising from the employment of consultancy firms which seconded 
Serpell Committee members. Transport Select Committee reports also were critical of 
both Serpell and the later privatisation proposals. Rail company accounts were important 
sources for understanding the impact of privatisation on costs and debt. 
      Examination and interpretation of the evidence which exposes the way in which 
beliefs and knowledge about the desirability of the radical reform of British Rail and 
subsequently its privatisation were created and gained acceptance aligns closely with 
Latour’s framework for studying modernity. This paper uses concepts derived from 
Actor-Network Theory in a flexible way, an approach encouraged by Latour himself who 
argued that the potentialities of Actor-Network Theory were still “largely untapped, 
especially the political implications” and so researchers should “continue all the way in 
developing” its potential (Latour, 1999, pp. 21, 24). Latourian research in its purest form 
is often criticised for neglecting issues such as political power, economic structures and 
the social order (Chua, 1995, pp. 116-117). This paper adopts a critical perspective, 
within Latour’s framework, to examine the promotion of neoliberal ideas by consultants 
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in the reform and subsequent fragmentation and privatisation of Britain’s rail network. It 
adopts one of the epistemic scripts of knowledge production, bricolage, where the 
researcher “rather than inventing a new theory or new paradigm, repairs or remodels 
existing theories by combining various theoretical concepts, ideas and observations” 
(Boxenbaum and Rouleau, 2011, p. 281). Different knowledge elements are assembled 
based on factors such as “practical value, and their potential for generating novel 
insights” (Boxenbaum and Rouleau, 2011, p. 281). This paper generates “novel insights” 
by combining the Latourian framework, neoliberalism, and empirical work on 
consultancy reports. 
 The Latourian (1987) framework has been used previously in a number of studies 
to analyse changes in accounting practices (see, for example, Chua, 1995; Jupe, 2000; 
Robson, 1991; Young, 1995). Christensen and Skaerbaek developed this framework to 
demonstrate how consultancy outputs are used “to settle controversies …. and how they 
can be successful to stabilize accounting technologies” (2010, p. 524). There is an 
appealing analogy between science and consultancy “because consultants claim both 
expertise and independence”, and powerful consultancy tools such as statistical methods 
can be persuasive in influencing organisations (Christensen and Skaerbaek, 2010, p. 527). 
Thus, the role of consultants often extends beyond that of the technical adviser and 
“proceeds into processes of persuasion” (Christensen and Skaerbaek, 2010, p. 526) which 
can be analysed in a Latourian framework. 
     Latour distinguishes between two sets of practices integral to the structure of 
knowledge - translation and purification - which in theory must remain “distinct if they 
are to remain effective” (Latour, 1993, p. 10). Much of the academic work drawing on 
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Actor-Network Theory focuses on translation. The focus of translation is on how ideas 
become accepted or rejected by audiences (Latour, 1987; Gendron and Baker, 2005, p. 
533). An idea gains in acceptance when it is “perceived as relevant and natural in solving 
certain problems” which people face (Gendron and Baker, 2005, p. 533). With 
translation, there is an “ongoing process by which claims are transformed as proponents 
seek to enrol other actors” in support (Gendron et al., 2007, p. 105). Chains of translation 
are constructed as claims are “progressively transformed  into facts through the enrolment 
of people who come to interpret claims and ideas in a way which caters to their own 
interests” (Gendron and Baker, 2005, p. 533). Ideas are not immutable during the 
translation process, as an  idea “undergoes a number of transformations as actors in the 
importing field develop interest and take it up” (Gendron and Baker, 2005, p. 563). 
Translation has been shown to provide many features that are relevant to the analysis of 
accounting changes and the role of consultants, particularly those from accounting firms 
(Briers and Chua, 2001; Christensen and Skaerbaek, 2010; Preston  et al., 1992). It can be 
argued that “accounting and scientific practices are clothed in the discourse of neutral, 
technical, professional endeavour” (Robson, 1991, p. 50). In practice, however, scientific 
and accounting discourses both involve controversies incorporating much “rhetoric”, the 
“name of the discipline that has, for millennia, studied how people are made to believe 
and behave and taught people how to persuade others” (Latour, 1987, p. 30). Rhetoric is 
central to these processes, where there may be a “trial of strength” and so it is necessary 
for allies to be “shaped and enrolled” if a viewpoint is to prevail (Latour, 1987, pp. 78, 
90).   
 13 
Latour emphasised the importance of rhetoric in influencing the outcome of 
scientific debates, where proponents of a new scientific theory need to employ  rhetoric   
in a trial of strength in order to mobilise a large enough network of allies if the theory is 
to become accepted (Latour, 1987, p. 61). When trials of strength are perceived as 
successful  “audiences’ interests with regard to the idea increase,  thereby strengthening 
the network of support” (Gendron and Baker, 2005, p. 533). A network refers to the webs 
of support provided by people and resources for particular knowledge claims (Latour, 
1987, pp. 180-182). Knowledge claims “are understood to be widely accepted … when 
they are supported by stable and solid networks” (Gendron et al., 2007, p. 105). A 
remarkable development of recent decades has been the growth in, and acceptance of, 
rhetoric in the form of knowledge claims “emerging in particular from auditors and 
management consultants” (Christensen and Skaerbaek, 2010, p. 524). It is argued that 
consultants can be seen as “experts”, working in organisations to develop knowledge 
claims in order to make accounting innovations successful through fact-building (Briers 
and Chua, 2001; Christensen and Skaerbaek, 2010; Preston et al., 1992). While Latour 
and Woolgar (1986) and Latour  (1987)  highlighted the importance of laboratories in the 
construction of scientific facts, “laboratories can encompass not just the activities of 
science, but also the production and legitimization of knowledge” by accountants 
(Gendron et al., 2007, pp. 105-106).   
The other practice identified by Latour as integral to the structure of knowledge, 
purification, is “a useful work requiring instruments, institutions and know-how” (Latour, 
1993, p. 78) which progresses ideas towards their acceptance.  Purification depends on 
controversy. Researchers in laboratories, like politicians, “have learned to construct 
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controversies and to referee them through convincing experiments” (Latour, 2004, p. 
144). Fact making by laboratories is crucial to purification, which results in a fact which 
“is collectively stabilised from the midst of controversies” but not necessarily accepted 
by all (Latour, 1987, p. 42). Consultants are frequently enrolled in conditions involving 
controversy, since such conditions form a pre-condition from which purification may 
result. Purification can be regarded as a form of mediation (Latour, 1993, p. 78). Fact 
making relies on mediators which “transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning 
or the elements they are supposed to carry” (Latour, 2005, p. 39).  Consultancy reports 
may be regarded, like scientific publications, as “mediators” which rely on scientific 
method “to achieve their effect” (Christensen and Skaerbaek, 2010, p. 527).  Reports 
drawing on scientific method “do not merely record a reality independent of themselves; 
they contribute powerfully to shaping, simply by measuring it, the reality they measure” 
(Callon, 1998, p, 23).  
In order to achieve their desired impact on reality, consultants need to transform 
the “contested values” of neoliberalism into what are argued to be hard facts (Christensen 
and Skaerbaek, 2010, p. 532). Consultants have performed an important role in many 
organisations in the “purification” of viewpoints, thus ensuring “accounting innovations 
become operable” (Christensen and Skaerbaek, 2010, p. 525). While Latour believes that 
purification and translation should remain separate (Latour, 1993, p. 10), in practice a 
blending of translation and purification “is important in order to make translations 
successful” (Christensen and Skaerbaek, 2010, p. 527). This has been clearly 
demonstrated in many countries which have sought to transform public sector practices, 
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values and beliefs according to neoliberal ideology, most notoriously in Great Britain 
with Prime Minister Thatcher. 
The concepts of translation and purification are employed  to inform the empirical 
analysis in sections four and five of this paper. Section four analyses how the Serpel 
Committee, established to radically reform and so purify British Rail’s structure and 
finances, was heavily influenced in its work and recommendations by the consultants 
seconded to it. Although Serpell was nominally independent, the Thatcher Government 
enrolled allies from consultancy firms as Committee members in order to influence the 
purification process. This purification attempt was followed by the Major Government’s 
fragmentation and privatisation of the rail network, which is examined in section five. 
Rail privatisation relied heavily on the work of allies from consultancy firms, whose 
reports were used to transform contested knowledge claims into accepted facts. 
Privatisation moved towards acceptance in a purification process where consultancy 
reports acted as mediators. This process was accelerated by the rise of neoliberal 
ideology. Neoliberalism framed the rhetoric of the controversial knowledge claims 
provided by the consultants in the debates on rail privatisation.  
3. Neoliberal ideology and its champions 
  Under liberal theory, individuals are seen as the engine of wealth creation and of 
national prosperity, thereby providing the only sure means of promoting the common 
good. Economic freedom, and hence a free market, encourages independence and 
individual responsibility, the very antithesis of the dependency and avoidance of personal 
responsibility that state intervention is said to produce. At the heart of the classical liberal 
theory developed by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke was the dependent relationship 
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between an individual’s liberty, the roles assumed by the state and the financial burdens 
that these would create and, hence, the impact on the sanctity of private property whereby 
each individual was to be allowed to employ their labour and capital as they believed 
best. Liberalism saw a need for the state but mainly to ensure the circumstances which 
would allow individuals the political and economic freedom to pursue their own best 
interests which was also the source of the well-being of the social collective (see Funnell 
et al., 2009, ch. 1). This would require that individuals were not burdened with 
overbearing, inhibiting financial requirements of the state exacted by taxation and other 
pecuniary imposts, that the state would make economy in service delivery its priority. To 
liberals, “the market was for the state a principle of limitation, that is the unique place 
where policymakers had to respect and impose the logic of ‘laissez-faire’” (Guénin-
Paracini and Gendron, 2014, p. 320). Under classical liberalism competition within the 
private sector was said to provide a surer guarantee of effective resource use than the 
state, and competition was seen as a “natural phenomenon” (Guénin-Paracini and 
Gendron, 2014, p. 320). 
In contrast to classic liberalism, neoliberalism has been perceived as “radically 
different”, in that “it gives the state an active role in building a society of entrepreneurs 
competing for resources” (Morales et al., 2014, p. 426).  Competition is not regarded as a 
“primitive datum”, rather “it is a formal structure that needs to be developed and 
constructed” (Guénin-Paracini and Gendron, 2014, p. 320). Hence, neoliberals support “a 
strong state as both producer and guarantor of a stable market society” (Mirowski, 2013, 
p. 54). Rather than eliminating the state, neoliberals seek to restructure the state through 
the rationalisation and marketization of the public sector (Mirowski, 2013, p. 57). Hence, 
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in many countries the public sector was opened up to private enterprise through 
rationalisation in the form of New Public Management (NPM). The foundation of NPM 
lay in reducing or removing  where possible differences between the public and private 
sectors, a process in which accounting was a key element “since it reflected high trust in 
the market and private business methods” (Hood, 1995, p. 94). Neoliberalism proposes 
that “human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private 
property rights, free markets and free trade” (Harvey, 2007, p. 2). Neoliberalism, driven 
by influential theorists such as Hayek and Friedman, set out to give preference to the 
sovereignty of the individual (Chabrak, 2011, pp. 460-463), but it also accorded the state 
a significant role in preserving an institutional framework. The state has to guarantee the  
integrity of the currency, establish defence, police, and legal structures  “to secure private 
property rights”, and guarantee “functioning of markets” (Harvey, 2007, p. 2). 
In countries such as Britain, a new public management coalition emerged in the 
1980s, drawn from “accounting firms, financial intermediaries, management consultants 
and business schools” (Hood, 1995, p. 102). This coalition was very influential, with 
management consultants playing a key role in “packaging, selling and implementing” 
reforms encompassed by the NPM umbrella (Greer, 1994, p. 29). Alongside full 
privatisation, NPM reforms included the outsourcing of public services, and schemes 
such as the Private Finance Initiative and Public Private Partnerships (Shaoul, 2005, p. 
468). In Britain in particular, and in many other countries, privatisation and its variants 
“transformed the public sector and public life in general”, and the neoliberal mantra 
became “private sector good, public sector bad” (Letza et al. 2004, p. 160). This 
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neoliberal mantra was used not only to justify rail privatisation itself, but also to validate 
the privatisation of policy formulation to consultants and think tanks. This went through 
two phases with Britain’s rail industry. The first phase which was started in 1982 by the 
Thatcher Government was a critical examination by private sector consultants of the 
operations and financial management of British Rail to provide the means to justify a 
greater role for the private sector in delivering British Rail’s services, here referred to as 
the attempted purification of British Rail’s finances. The second phase, delayed until the 
Major Government in the 1990s, again enlisted the contributions of private sector 
consultants to bring about the acceptance of full privatisation of British Rail with the 
purification of the very controversial policy of rail privatisation.  In both the first and 
second phases, consultants drew heavily on neoliberal ideology to justify their 
controversial recommendations for the reform and, ultimately, the privatisation of British 
Rail. 
4. Phase I: Purification of British Rail’s finances 
4.1 Historical background  
In 1945 the Labour Government, led by Prime Minister Attlee, was elected on a 
manifesto which included a key commitment to bring the principal utilities into public 
ownership. Although regarded as socialist dogma by some critics, the nationalisation of 
the coal, gas, electricity and transport industries was partly the logical extension of the 
previous regulation of essential industries in both world wars, and was intended to benefit 
business as the output of these industries “would be more widely and cheaply available” 
(Chick, 1987, p. 106). The nationalisation of Britain’s four major rail companies in 1948, 
along with freight, buses and London Transport, was further justified on several grounds, 
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including the record of inadequate investment by private transport companies and the fact 
that the transport industries contained “strong elements of natural monopolies and 
externalities” (Millward, 1997, p. 230). The rail companies were run-down and debt-
ridden and had struggled financially in the 20th century because of the decline of 
traditional industries and the rise of road transport (Wolmar, 2005, p. 21). The integrated 
rail industry under public ownership was intended to operate more efficiently for the 
benefit of its users, particularly industry, without being constrained by its former reliance 
on private capital. In practice, however, British Rail still faced the problem that while 
over half the costs of operating a railway are associated with infrastructure provision, the 
service is not “comprehensive and universal” and unavoidable (Shaoul, 2004, p. 30). 
Thus, rail is quite unlike essential, utilities such as water and gas, which can spread fixed 
costs over a large number of users.  
The problem of full cost recovery meant that throughout Europe rail services 
required government support (Jupe and Crompton, 2006, p. 1038). In Britain, this came 
partly in the form of subsidies to cover the operating costs of loss-making passenger 
services and capital grants which, in theory, were available to facilitate investment. In 
practice, successive governments compelled British Rail to finance its capital investment 
with interest-bearing public debt, thus making it virtually impossible to break even 
(Wolmar, 2005, p. 40). Rail’s financial problems under public ownership were 
exacerbated by the generous terms granted to former shareholders, whose equity was 
converted into 30-year loan stock with returns in the form of fixed interest payments 
which British Rail was obliged to pay, even if making losses. Further, there were other 
financial constraints, such as making British Rail pay for the enforced purchase of over 
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500,000 freight wagons owned by customers of the railway companies; many wagons 
were in such a poor state that they were scrapped immediately (Wolmar, 2005, p. 27).      
By the 1970s, British Rail had made progress in improving safety (Wolmar, 2005, 
p. 100),  while making advances in inter-city passenger service provision and delivering 
some, albeit modest, productivity improvements (Gourvish, 2002, pp. 54, 66). Its market 
share had been falling steadily for two decades, however, and it became known for its 
losses. The Conservative Government elected in 1979 was led by Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher who had “a distinct antipathy towards the public sector in general and 
the railways in particular” (Gourvish, 2002, p. 100). Despite its unprofitability, British 
Rail was not an early priority for full privatisation given its subsidy dependence and the 
presumed unpopularity of a major contraction in services. British Rail along with other 
public sector bodies, however, was subject to rigorous financial discipline by a 
government “intolerant of (what it saw as) managerial incompetence” (Dent, 1991, p. 
724). Thus, British Rail’s subsidy and borrowing requirements were strictly controlled 
and it was required to sell peripheral businesses such as hotels and ferries. Concerned 
about British Rail’s losses in the recession of the early 1980s, the Thatcher Government 
established the Serpell Committee on Railway Finances, chaired by a former Permanent 
Secretary of the Transport Department, to review British Rail’s performance and to 
secure improved financial results. The Serpell Committee, which has had very little 
scrutiny in the academic literature, both prefigured and influenced future events. The 
Conservative Government enrolled consultants to provide critical reports to the 
Committee in conditions involving controversy; the Committee’s recommendations later 
influenced the rail privatisation plans in the 1990s.  
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4.2 Consultants and the purification attempts   
Determined to impose rigorous financial discipline on British Rail, the Thatcher 
Government enrolled allies from the private sector as mediators in a purification process, 
and heavily influenced the four-person membership of the Serpell Committee which 
sought British Rail’s partial privatisation. This was despite the fact that Transport 
Secretary David Howell, when establishing the Committee, announced that its Chair Sir 
David Serpell would have “the necessary position of total independence” (Department of 
Transport, 1983a). The members included Leslie Bond, a director of the Rank 
organisation, Jim Butler, from the accountancy firm Peat, Marwick, Mitchell (PMM) 
(which, in a later merger, became KPMG), and Alfred Goldstein from the consulting 
engineers R.Travers, Morgan (TM). Both Butler and Goldstein were senior partners in 
their respective firms. Goldstein’s appointment was particularly controversial as he was a 
close friend of Sir Alan Walters, the Prime Minister’s economic adviser, and an 
“intellectual right-winger fond of theoretical excursions and in favour of converting 
railways into roads” (Gourvish, 2002, p. 169). The conditions for enrolling consultants 
“necessarily involve controversy since that forms a pre-condition from which purification  
may … eventuate” (Christensen and Skaerbaek, 2010, p. 529). The Committee’s 
membership alone guaranteed controversy irrespective of its aims; controversy which 
was compounded by the Committee’s working practices which involved a significant 
conflict of interest. Although it examined reports from British Rail and other bodies, a 
large amount of work was outsourced by the Committee at a cost of £627,000 (Gourvish, 
2002, p. 180) to the two consultancy firms which had seconded senior partners to the 
Serpell Committee. 
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The importance of this outsourcing to consultants by the Committee is shown 
throughout the Serpell Report. The terms of reference for the consultants reveal their 
fundamental  role in shaping the deliberations of the Committee. TM were commissioned 
to “examine critically … the BR Board’s present, planned and foreseeable expenditure on 
engineering” (Serpell, 1983, Annex B), while PMM were commissioned to obtain 
“financial information .... in particular: to examine and report on British Rail’s costs and 
revenue forecasts …. to assist in the preparation of financial estimates of the likely effects 
of options for alternative policies identified by the Committee” (Serpell, 1983, Annex C). 
The covering letter to the Transport Secretary, at the beginning of the Report, makes it 
clear that chapter 6, on engineering costs, is based on “advice received” from TM 
(Serpell, 1983, p. 1). The introduction to the Report asserted that it is a “summation of 
our own views as an independent Committee” (emphasis added), but explicitly 
acknowledged  that “we have been greatly helped in reaching them by the professional 
advice of two firms of consultants” who were commissioned to “develop and evaluate” 
the “network options in Part II” of the Report and to study British Rail’s 1982 Budget and 
Rail Plan (Serpell, 1983, para. 6). These extensive, influential contributions of the 
consultants were contained in 12 of the 41 files of working papers supporting the Serpell 
Report. The consultants, although appointed by government, were keen to be seen to 
assert their independence. When British Rail raised concerns over the role of PMM, for 
example, it received such a robust response from the firm that British Rail’s Director of 
Finance and Planning felt obliged to reply: “I fully understand and accept your point 
about the independence of your role in advising the Serpell Committee” (Department of 
Transport, 1983b).   
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Part I of the Serpell Report, which examined British Rail’s finances, drew heavily 
on the 200-page PMM analysis of British Rail and its supporting papers prepared by 
Committee  member Jim Butler, apparently oblivious to the blatant conflict of interest 
that this represented. Butler had been a partner of PMM since 1965 and Government 
Director of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company since 1971. Butler’s study 
emphasised the need for: the reappraisal of engineering standards in order to enable “cost 
reductions while complying with safety standards”; the reduction in employment costs; 
the reduction in rolling stock costs by buying in vehicles rather than using the wholly 
owned subsidiary British Rail Engineering Limited; the reduction of track maintenance 
and renewal costs; and the reduction of track mileage (Department of Transport, 1983c,  
paras. 2.7.2, 2.10.1, 2.10.5, 2.10.6, 2.10.7). Part II of the Report, which examined six 
network options, was based on the options study by TM (Department of Transport, 
1983d). This was made clear in the Serpell Report, which acknowledged that “our 
consultants … developed and evaluated 6 network options” (1983, para. 13.16). 
Drawing on the extensive input provided by the consultancy firms, the Serpell 
Report attempted to purify British Rail’s finances by arguing that the nationalised 
industry was highly and persistently inefficient and had high costs, particularly in the 
areas of track mileage, employment and engineering. This ‘impure’ position was 
contrasted with a ‘pure’ position of improved finances which could be attained through 
reductions in lines, staff numbers and track maintenance costs (1983). The key drivers of 
change towards rail’s purified finances would be the introduction of competition and 
partial privatisation. Hence, British Rail was strongly criticised for being “the only major 
railway in the world, other than in India”, which manufactured its own rolling stock 
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(Serpell, 1983, para. 7.6). This meant that most of British Rail’s expenditure on the 
purchase and maintenance of rolling stock was paid to British Rail Engineering Limited, 
rather than to private sector suppliers. Despite accepting that British Rail’s engineering 
subsidiary was competitive when producing high volumes of rolling stock, the Serpell 
Committee argued that costs would be reduced by fragmenting and privatising British 
Rail Engineering Limited, or by tendering for all new build contracts and contracting out 
repairs and maintenance work (Serpell, 1993, paras. 7.10, 7.30). The Serpell Committee 
demonstrated its ideological approach when it highlighted the “strong interest among 
some manufacturers” in obtaining a larger share of the rolling stock market (1983, para. 
7.27). Its recommendations could be seen as calculated preludes to full privatisation. 
Alongside the need for partial privatisation and competition, the Report provided 
TM’s six options for rail’s future, ranging from the maintenance of the existing network 
of 10,000 route miles (miles of train route with at least one track) to a drastic reduction to 
an unsubsidised network of 1,630 route miles (Serpell, 1983, Part II, chaps. 13,14). 
Whichever option was selected by government, the Report adopted PMM’s approach and 
highlighted the need for significant reductions in the workforce, given that a “one per 
cent reduction in the present wage bill improves the railway’s finances by about £14 
million” (Serpell, 1983, para. 9.13). Further, the Report accepted TM’s argument that, 
however many lines were kept open, there was scope for significant savings by reducing 
routine track maintenance work to “the lowest level of maintenance consistent with 
maintaining safety” (Serpell, 1983, para. 6.17). The overwhelming thrust of the Report 
was the need for cost savings, with only two of its 96 pages devoted to how revenue 
might be increased. Although the Report argued that there was “little scope” for 
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increasing revenue from fares (Serpell, 1993, para. 5.1), this pessimism was soon to be 
contradicted as the economy recovered from recession and passenger miles increased by 
26% between 1982 and 1988/89 (Gourvish, 2002, p. 443).   
 
4.3 Responses to purification attempts 
To explore the responses to the attempts of the Serpell Committee to radically 
reform British Rail’s structure and finances, the reactions of the other key actors in the 
reform and eventual privatisation of British Rail are examined: British Rail itself, 
members of the House of Commons and the House of Lords, the Treasury, and the 
Conservative Government. British Rail’s Board had hoped for a report supporting a case 
for additional infrastructure expenditure, but was faced with a document arguing for 
substantial reductions in engineering costs. Hence, when confronted with the extreme 
recommendations of the Serpell Committee for line closures, the Board sought to enrol 
allies to its cause to challenge the Report’s knowledge claims by orchestrating leaks, 
before the full Report was published, which “focused media attention on the more 
draconian prescriptions offered for the network” (Gourvish, 2002, p. 178). The British 
Rail Board, chaired by Peter Parker, then formulated its response, which was published 
with the Serpell Report. This accepted that improvements could be made to engineering, 
but criticised Serpell for providing unreliable information and for making few specific 
recommendations, instead focusing on broad  headline recommendations (Gourvish, 
2002, p. 179).  
Very quickly, British Rail successfully enrolled many allies in a network in 
opposition to Serpell. Newspapers attacked the Serpell Report, providing headlines 
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including “Heading for buffers” and “A really rotten report” (Gourvish, 2002, p. 179). 
Simon Jenkins, a journalist and non-executive director of British Rail, attacked Serpell in 
The Observer. There were very critical responses to Serpell in debates in both Houses of 
Parliament. In the Commons, criticism came not only from the Labour Party, but also 
from Robert Adley, a Conservative MP with a deep understanding of rail. Adley 
condemned the report as “useless as a basis for decisions about the future” of the 
railways. He suggested that consultants from the Australian offices of TM were not “the 
best people” to report on the UK’s rail system, and argued that British Rail’s “subsidy” 
should be regarded as “investment” in infrastructure (Adley, 1983). In the Lords, 
criticism was led by Lord Marsh, a former Chair of British Rail, who condemned the 
report as being of “no value whatsoever” in determining “what we want from the 
railway” (Marsh, 1983). He also commented acerbically on Serpell’s conflict of interest, 
arising from the outsourcing of consultancy work to firms providing senior partners who 
were members of the Committee, arguing that it resembled “ inviting the Kray family to 
pass judgement on the twins” (Marsh, 1993). Further rebukes to Serpell came from the 
Transport Select Committee, which, amongst many criticisms, highlighted the inclusion 
of the extreme network options as “positively unhelpful”, and reproached Serpell for 
using firms seconding senior partners to the Committee as consultants (Transport 
Committee, 1983, paras. 20, 22-23). There was thus a keen awareness of the intentions of 
the government in creating a committee dominated by representatives of firms which 
might stand to gain great advantage from privatisation. 
An internal ministerial group (MISC 94) was established in March 1983 to 
consider the Report but, with a general election pending, the political fall-out of “a sharp 
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cut in the railways was judged too risky” (Parker, 2013, p. 314). The Treasury submitted 
an influential paper to MISC 94, which, contrary to its later views, argued against full or 
partial privatisation of British Rail. The stated reasons included that the railways “can 
never be entirely free from financial support from government”, and that the railways 
were considered to be “a large and complex system with many joint costs and inter-
dependence of different services: hence it cannot easily be broken into separate elements” 
(Parker, 2013, p. 314). Despite these concerns, a Cabinet colleague with strong neoliberal 
instincts tried to raise the issue of rail privatisation with Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher but was bluntly rebuffed by the prediction that it would become the 
government’s “Waterloo” (Wolmar, 2005, p. 50).  
Although British Rail successfully resisted Serpell’s most extreme options for line 
closures, thus destroying some of the Report’s knowledge claims, it had not won the case 
for substantial infrastructure investment and faced a Conservative Government 
determined to impose “harsh economic disciplines” in the form of financial objectives 
which were “progressively tightened” (Dent, 1991, p. 714). While the consultants may 
appear to have produced an unsuccessful attempt at purification, British Rail undertook 
two major internal reorganisations in order to inject business criteria into a wide range of 
important decisions. The first of these, the origins of which predated Serpell, involved a 
deliberate attempt to challenge British Rail’s dominant “railway culture”. This culture 
incorporated “a bureaucratic organization with a heritage of railway engineering and 
public service”, where the network was still run by Regional General Managers (Dent, 
1991, p. 714). The first reorganisation involved the appointment of Sector Managers, and 
the injection of business criteria into a much wider range of decisions affecting rolling 
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stock, infrastructure and administration (Gourvish, 2002, pp. 106-150). The Sector 
Managers contributed to the development of a counter “business” culture which 
“cascaded across the senior management elite to become dominant” (Dent, 1991, p. 724). 
This initiative was developed “largely independently of political ideas”, its private sector 
leanings owing more to the advice of “business consultants than to any political agenda” 
(Dent, 1991, p. 728). 
The second major reorganisation, Organising for Quality, which came after 
Serpell, culminated in the elimination of British Rail’s traditional regional structure and 
the division of staff among sectors, consisting of six businesses and 27 profit centres 
(Gourvish, 2002, pp. 374-383). This culminating change “represented the full flowering 
of the business-led, sector management concept” (Gourvish, 2002, p. 383). Alongside 
these home-grown structural and cultural changes, Serpell’s influence was apparent, 
however, as extensive productivity gains were made through substantial reductions in the 
number of employees, a policy which the Report had strongly advocated. The number of 
employees declined by 30% in the 1980s, and then by an additional 12% in the early 
1990s (Gourvish, 2002, pp. 270-276; 291-294). These redundancies were reflected in 
British Rail’s improved financial performance, such that before privatisation it appeared 
to be one of the most financially successful railways in Europe with a subsidy of only 
0.16% of GDP compared to the European average of 0.52% (Harris and Godward, 1997, 
p. 52). These apparent improvements, however, were problematic. Market share was 
sacrificed as fares were raised most years by more than the rate of inflation, and 
expenditure on the network, although improving, was insufficient “to reverse a long-term 
record of net disinvestment” (Gourvish, 2002, p. 230).  
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  The most important long-term consequence of the purification attempts of Serpell 
was to arrive in the 1990s. In the early 1980s, British Rail’s privatisation was 
“inconceivable” (Dent, 1991, p. 727), and the Thatcher Government’s caution in the 
election year of 1983 meant that Serpell’s most radical proposals were not pursued. The 
development of the business culture, which was seen by British Rail’s management  “as a 
home-grown solution to governmental attack”,arguably, however, “created  preconditions 
for the discussion of privatisation” (Dent, 1991, pp. 727-728); for the “crafted accounts 
representing the railway as a series of businesses … permeated through management 
structures and systems to operations on the ground. The railway … has become its 
businesses” (Dent,1991, p. 729). As Hood noted (1995, p. 107), NPM has been adopted 
in some countries to avert the adoption of the full “New Right agenda for privatization”, 
but in other cases it has been “the first step towards realizing that agenda”. The task of 
realising the agenda of rail privatisation, which is examined in the next section, was taken 
up by Margaret Thatcher’s successor.  
 
5. Phase 2: Purification of rail privatisation 
5.1 Purification process 
  It was Margaret Thatcher’s supposedly more “moderate” successor as Prime 
Minister, John Major, who introduced the privatisation of Britain’s last remaining 
nationalised industry. Citing the need to raise revenue, to reduce rail’s subsidy, and to 
introduce competition, the Major Government, emboldened by consultancy reports 
commissioned near the end of the Thatcher Government, embarked on the riskiest and 
most ideological privatisation to date (Gourvish, 2002, pp. 383-491; Wolmar, 2005, pp. 
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48-98). Rail was a very unpopular privatisation, the introduction of which was not 
inevitable. Widespread criticism of the privatisation proposals developed, encouraged by 
the media and reflecting opposition from rail and public transport lobby groups, the rail 
trade unions, the Labour Party, and some Conservative backbenchers. The criticism was 
crisply encapsulated by the prophetic warning of “a Poll Tax on wheels” (Adley, 1992), 
delivered by a leading Conservative critic, which was widely quoted by opponents of 
privatisation. Given this substantial opposition, the Major Government needed to rely on 
skilled allies to establish networks of support in order to transform the contested 
neoliberal values underlying rail privatisation into knowledge claims.  
From the Conservative Government’s perspective, useful allies had emerged from 
think tanks which, in the USA and Britain, have been very influential in developing 
applications of the neoliberal ideology. In 1985 Britain’s Adam Smith Institute, an 
influential think tank espousing free market ideas which was founded in 1977, suggested 
privatisation by a process of fragmenting the integrated railway. This suggestion was later 
developed into two influential Institute publications, The Right Lines and Track to the 
Future, which developed the controversial proposal, later to be adopted as the model for 
rail privatisation, to create an infrastructure authority which would be separate from 
franchised train operating companies (Irvine, 1987, 1988). (Their author, Irvine, provided 
further assistance to the Conservatives by contributing to the rail privatisation proposals 
in their 1992 election manifesto). Neoliberal think tank opinion was not, however, 
unanimous. At a Centre for Policy Studies conference in 1988, for example, it was 
presciently argued that the proposed fragmented privatisation model, with a monopolist 
track authority charging operators for network access, could lead to a poorer quality of 
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service as it would be remote from customers, lack incentives to pursue efficiency, and 
might allow infrastructure assets to deteriorate (Murray, 2001, p. 11).   
The critique presented at the Centre for Policy Studies conference was in line with 
British Rail’s viewpoint. Transport Secretary MacGregor held two meetings with British 
Rail’s senior management. The first was with British Rail’s Chair, Reid, and Chief 
Executive, John Welsby, followed by a second meeting with British Rail’s 27 senior 
managers. All of the British Rail staff strongly opposed the proposal to separate the track 
from operations. Not only was this professional advice ignored, British Rail’s position 
was regarded as obstructive and so it was excluded “from the policy-making arena”, 
denied access to some of the consultancy reports (Dudley & Richardson, 2000, p. 224) 
and, hence, had limited ability to influence the networks supporting privatisation. This 
clearly established that privatisation was to be achieved, all that had to be decided was 
how to bring it about and how to undermine the credibility of British Rail’s expertise with 
the least political damage to the government. The solution to both problems was to rely 
on allies from a range of consultants, often from the Big 5 accounting firms. A 
“staggering” £450 million was spent on consultants, many of whom had no prior 
knowledge of the rail industry, in preparing for privatisation  (Wolmar, 2005, p. 68). This 
figure represented one eighth of British Rail’s pre-privatisation annual revenue. Table 1 
shows some of the consultants’ extensive involvement in planning and implementing rail 
privatisation. As well as making crucial contributions to planning the privatisation model, 
accounting consultants actively participated in developing the privatised industry. Jim 
Butler, a member of the Serpell Committee, for example, was appointed to the British 
Rail Board in 1994 to facilitate its privatisation (Gourvish, 2002, p. 421). 
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    TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE 
   
Consultants were commissioned to report on “how and when” British Rail should 
be privatised (Department of Transport, 1991, p. 1), and so their reports became key 
purifying devices especially given the level and volume of opposition to privatisation. An 
analysis of structural options by accountants Deloitte, Haskins & Sells (DHS) established 
knowledge claims which were confirmed by later consultancy reports. There was a 
“collective process of validation” as the reports accumulated, which was significant in 
“the construction of networks of support around claims to expertise” (Gendron et al., 
2007, p. 101). These claims focused on the option involving a track authority and 
franchised train operators as it would encourage “competitive pressures” in bidding for 
franchises, which would bring efficiency gains in the form of cost and subsidy reductions 
(British Railways Board, 1989a, para. 466). DHS favoured as much competition in the 
privatised rail industry as possible, arguing that this would encourage the greatest 
“efficiency improvements” (British Railways Board, 1989b, para. 264). The analysis was 
very theoretical, however, even citing the “survival of the fittest” argument where  
“inefficient” companies go out of business, without explaining how this could apply to a 
public service (British Railways Board, 1989b, para. 262). The analysis of the fragmented 
model was similarly optimistic in its consideration of the impact of privatisation on 
safety, which was argued to be “straightforward” as a “single chain of command” could 
be established through the track authority which would be responsible for the safety of 
both the infrastructure and the train operators (British Railways Board, 1989b,  paras. 
231, 232). Further optimism was displayed by the proposal to improve the quality of 
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passenger services by making quality “a condition of subsidy” (British Railways Board, 
1989c, Table 7.1, p.3).  
The knowledge claims provided by the DHS report were reinforced and 
supplemented by claims in other consultancy reports, such as that of the engineering 
consultants Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett (PHB). The PHB report concurred with the claims 
of the DHS report, and argued that regulation would ensure that the track authority used 
the access charges paid by train operators to invest in order to maintain and enhance “the 
capacity of the infrastructure” (Department of Transport, 1991, p. 74). The neoliberal 
optimism which underlay this model was highlighted by the fact that the PHB report 
acknowledged that there were “no British or overseas examples” of such a track authority 
(Department of Transport, 1991, p. 45). The knowledge claims provided by consultancy 
reports were employed by the key consultant at the heart of rail policy-making, Sir 
Christopher Foster, senior partner with Coopers and Lybrand, who became special 
adviser to the Transport Secretary from April 1992 to November 1993, and later a non-
executive director of Railtrack. He distilled the work of consultants into four key 
knowledge claims in the rail privatisation White Paper, New opportunities for the 
railways (Department of Transport, 1992). These claims were that the privatised railway, 
with the aid of regulation, would: ensure that investment continued to maintain and 
improve the railway; reduce costs and subsidy; maintain safety; and lead to a higher 
quality of service. 
Foster’s neoliberal defence of rail privatisation was later published in a 
Discussion Paper (Foster, 1994). Foster argued in very partisan, ideological terms that 
privatisation would “release energy and a positive attitude to change”, and provide 
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incentives to improve efficiency (Foster, 1994, pp. 2, 3). The core neoliberal proposition 
was that devolving British Rail’s role to around 100 separate companies would “replace 
command relationships” by “contractual relationships between free-standing autonomous 
bodies” (Foster, 1994, p. 5). Foster argued that the key contractual relationship would be 
between the track authority and the train operators in the vertical separation of the rail 
industry. His defence of this radical change, which completely ignored the gains from 
British Rail’s decade of reorganisations, was that the industry’s command relationships 
were “complicated, inefficient, ineffective and bureaucratic” (Foster, 1994, p. 7). 
Ironically, as section 6 will demonstrate, these charges would prove to be a far more 
accurate description of the contractual relationships under privatisation.  
By employing consultants who were accountants to develop the complex 
privatisation model, the Major Government used accounting’s legitimacy to attempt to 
“depoliticise”, and so purify, its unpopular and highly ideological activities (Catchpowle 
et al., 2004, p. 1053). For the supporters of such ideological activities, however, the use 
of consultants in this way represented a triumph. Madsen Pirie, founder of the Adam 
Smith Institute, argued that everyone “noticed the privatisation of the large-scale 
industries and utilities, but few people have noticed that policy formulation itself was 
privatised” (Pirie, 1993; cited by Ward (1993, p. 305)). The further opportunities for 
consultancy earnings from the policy formulation involved in BR’s privatisation were 
highlighted the next year by Management Consultancy magazine, whose triumphalist 
article “On a Fast Track to Fee Income” was the subject of a critical House of Commons 
motion sponsored by Brian Wilson, Labour’s Shadow Transport Minister. The motion on 
consultants and rail privatisation argued: 
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            That this House notes the article in the current issue of Management Consultancy   
 magazine  …  which predicts that the splintering of BR will provide consultants 
 with a gravy train of considerable length … further notes that Sir Christopher 
 Foster, Coopers and Lybrand partner … formerly adviser on rail privatisation to 
 the Secretary of State for Transport before (being) … appointed to  the board of 
 Railtrack, is quoted in support of the gravy-train thesis … and believes that the 
 British public would prefer investment in real trains to sponsorship of gravy trains 
 operated by the Government’s friends in the consultancy industry... (Wilson, 
 1994). 
 
There was a crucial difference between the reactions of a key actor, the Treasury, 
to the Serpell Report and to the full privatisation proposals. While the Treasury had 
originally been very cautious about introducing radical changes to British Rail, a decade 
had passed which had included the privatisation of large, complex industries such as gas, 
water and electricity. Neoliberal ideas had permeated the state, and its champions now 
occupied senior positions in the civil service. A very influential figure was Steve Robson, 
who led the privatisation drive as head of the Treasury’s privatisation unit. The 
Treasury’s revised view was that rail’s fragmentation and privatisation would enable a 
reduction in subsidy, through the introduction of competition, and Robson “played the 
key role” in driving through the fragmented privatisation model which was adopted 
(Wolmar, 2005, p. 53).  
  Of the key actors involved in rail privatisation, British Rail had been excluded 
from full access to the policy making network, while the Conservative Government 
ensured that it had the strong support of consultants and the Treasury in a “stable and 
solid” network (Gendron et al., 2007, p. 105).The role of consultants was crucial in 
serving “the knowledge needs” of those holding “positions of political power within the 
state apparatus” (Saint-Martin, 1998, p. 348). Despite its limited access to the 
privatisation  network, British Rail’s Board and the majority of senior managers, most of 
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whom “would have been far happier to run with a private, but vertically integrated 
industry” (Gourvish, 2002, p. 433), attempted to oppose the fragmented privatisation 
model. British Rail’s Chair, Sir Bob Reid, attempted to raise problems with the proposed 
model in a prescient letter sent to the (then) Transport Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind in 
April 1991, which pointed out the “complexity” of fragmenting the railways; the “strange 
looking” privatisation which would depend on “continued subsidy”; and the danger to 
safety posed by the “radical reorganisation” (British Railways Board, 1991).  
These knowledge claims, which drew on BR’s expertise and that of its own 
consultants, made no discernible impact on the privatisation networks which continued  
to support the fragmented model. This is demonstrated by the briefing note, prepared for 
the British Rail Chair’s meeting with Malcolm Rifkind’s successor as Transport 
Secretary, John MacGregor, when the privatisation White Paper was published 14 months 
later. The briefing note emphasised similar points to the 1991 letter, highlighting “points 
of major concern” with the fragmented privatisation model (British Railways Board, 
1992a, introduction). It accurately predicted that the track access charges paid by 
operating companies would  lead to increases in both costs and subsidy, and that there 
could be difficulty in maintaining safety standards (British Railways Board, 1992a, notes 
2, 4).  
British Rail’s briefing note drew partly on the work of its consultant Professor 
Bradshaw, a transport expert, who prepared a critical analysis of the fragmented 
privatisation model proposed by consultants PHB. Bradshaw’s prescient critique foresaw 
that tendering for the maintenance of the infrastructure assets carried “a great danger of 
asset rundown” (Bradshaw, 1991, p. 3). Further, Bradshaw, crucially, highlighted the risk 
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that the track access charges to operators might not “cover costs” for the infrastructure 
authority, and raised serious doubts about how the “capital market disciplines would 
work” with the monopolist track authority (Bradshaw, 1991, pp. 5, 7, 10).  
Having established a stable network of support for privatisation, the government 
was sufficiently confident to ignore the knowledge claims of BR and its consultants.  It 
was still necessary for Parliament to approve the privatisation legislation, in the form of 
the 1993 Railways Bill. This was not certain as opposition to rail privatisation included 
the Labour Party and some Conservative MPs, led by Robert Adley, and votes in both 
Houses of Parliament were often “uncomfortably close” (Gourvish, 2002, p. 433). Adley 
was a prominent member of the Save Our Railways campaign group, established to 
oppose rail privatisation, and chaired the Transport Select Committee. The Conservative-
dominated Committee conducted a detailed examination of the 1993 Railways Bill and in 
April 1993 produced a unanimous critical report emphasising the risks involved in rail 
privatisation. Presciently, it warned of the risks involved in relying on private sector 
investment, the danger that costs and subsidy would rise, and the problems of  
maintaining safety standards (Transport Committee, 1993, paras. 367, 501, 474). The 
Conservative Government was able to protect the ideological core of its proposals by 
arguing that, despite these warnings, the Transport Committee had not opposed rail 
privatisation in principle. Further, Adley died the month after the Committee’s report was 
published, and the campaign against privatisation lost momentum. The Railways Bill was 
subject to many amendments, but the Major Government secured its passing into law in 
November 1993. 
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The contribution of consultants extended way beyond policy formulation to 
assisting in the implementation of the privatisation model. Railtrack’s structure, role and 
job descriptions were devised by management consultants McKinsey, who categorised 
the role of the Chief Executive as ensuring that the company optimised “ the value of its 
network and assets”, and highlighted two “core railway capabilities” as “maintaining the 
network” to maximise its value and “exploiting property for maximum value” (British 
Railways Board, 1992b, Appendices B5, C21). Extensive work on rail’s cost structure, 
the fault attribution framework, and access charges was undertaken by Coopers and 
Lybrand and Touche Ross (Department of Transport, 1993, p. 1; Department of 
Transport, 1995, pp. 6, 7). 
As rail privatisation became increasingly certain, there was a range of views on  
its likely success across the media. Newspapers with a free market focus generally 
welcomed rail privatisation in principle but predicted that there could be problems in 
practice. The Times, for example, argued that the policy implementation was likely to be 
“desperately muddled” unless British Rail were allowed to run some franchises 
(Editorial, 1993). A leading critic was the transport correspondent of The Independent, 
Christian Wolmar, who argued presciently that rail privatisation would lead to increased 
costs and subsidy (1993), and continued to campaign against the fragmented structure in 
both newspaper articles and a very critical book (2005). Opinion polls revealed a majority 
of the public remained consistently opposed to rail privatisation, opposition which was 




5.2 Privatisation of British Rail: The triumph of purification 
The key consequence of the purification process was the splintering of the 
integrated structure of British Rail. Despite their opposition to the fragmented model, 
British Rail’s Board and senior managers worked hard to dismantle the structure 
established under the Organising for Quality reforms, which had only just been 
completed in 1992. The pressure on many key managers was “intense”, and the railway’s 
punctuality performance deteriorated as staff had to keep train services running while 
restructuring the industry (Gourvish, 2002, pp. 442-443). Railtrack, the infrastructure 
owner, was privatised in 1996, and by the next year all the rail businesses had been sold 
and an “unparalleled” degree of fragmentation had been introduced into the industry 
(Nash, 2000, p. 166). The privatisation of British Rail was now complete, demonstrating 
the triumph of purification.  
The system was divided into around 100 components, which included: Railtrack; 
25 franchised passenger operating companies (TOCs) selected in a competitive bidding 
process; three rolling stock companies (ROSCOs); 13 infrastructure companies; six 
freight companies (soon reduced to two); and some support companies. This increased 
complexity of rail was reflected in its regulatory system, which included two new bodies: 
The Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR) (later renamed the Office of Rail Regulation), 
and the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising. The former body supervised Railtrack, 
while the latter allocated franchises, dispensed subsidies and monitored the TOCs’ 
performance. The ORR’s key regulatory task was periodically to set the level of track 
access charges, which would be paid to Railtrack by the TOCs. The level of access 
charges was crucial both for Railtrack’s profitability and for the viability of the TOCs, 
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most of which were unprofitable and, contrary to the optimism of the neoliberals, 
continued to depend on subsidy, even though the subsidy was only intended to be 
temporary. In 1999/2000, for example, the TOCs received £1.4 billion in subsidy, which 
underpinned their payment to Railtrack of £2.2 billion in access charges, charges which 
represented 85% of the company’s total income.  
  A major consequence of the purification process was the changed attitude of the 
Labour Party, which originally opposed privatisation on principle and called for the 
renationalisation of industries, including rail. Gradually, however, the approach of senior 
figures in the Labour Party towards privatisation began to shift. Tony Blair, elected  as 
leader in 1994, persuaded the party to rewrite Clause IV of its constitution, replacing the 
“common ownership” of the means of production, distribution and exchange with an 
emphasis on “the market” and “a thriving private sector” (Toye, 2004, pp. 92-93). Labour 
Party members accepted this ideological shift for several reasons. Many were 
demoralised by the combined impact of three further Conservative election victories since 
Margaret Thatcher’s election in 1979, and the decreased union membership during the 
1980s heightened the need to attract donations from business (Toye, 2004, p. 99).  
Following the rewriting of Clause IV, “a new perspective began to influence transport 
policy” and Labour’s 1997 election manifesto argued that rail must be run in the public 
interest with higher levels of investment (Jupe, 2009a, p. 715). Despite the many cogent 
criticisms which Labour and other opponents had previously levelled at rail privatisation, 
the knowledge claims produced by the consultants became the accepted truth. Underlying 
this purification of the party’s policy on rail privatisation was the neoliberal political 
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settlement of Reagan and Thatcher, “which became a legacy that a subsequent generation 
of political leaders found hard to dislodge” (Harvey, 2007, p. 62). 
 
6. The knowledge claims and outcomes of rail privatisation    
This section deconstructs the key knowledge claims of the proponents of rail 
privatisation. It has been established that these claims were successful in their purification 
attempts, as rail privatisation was implemented despite significant opposition. The 
experience of rail privatisation, however, may be employed critically in order to 
transform the apparently purified position into one where impurities can be highlighted. 
This analysis builds a detailed case against the fallacy of the key knowledge claims 
involved in the neoliberal rhetoric employed by the supporters of rail privatisation. A 
significant part of the success of the consultants in formulating rail privatisation policy 
derived from their ability to counter the expertise of opponents, particularly British Rail, 
who predicted the key problems which would arise from adopting the fragmented model. 
Hence, the four key knowledge claims produced in the 1992 White Paper are examined 
below, in the light of the outcomes of rail privatisation, in order to expose the flaws of the 
privatisation model.  
 
6.1 Invest to maintain and improve the network 
In the 1992 White Paper it was argued that the government “wants to ensure that 
Railtrack continues to invest to maintain and improve the network”, and that investment 
would largely be financed from access charges (Department of Transport, 1992, para. 
43). However, consistent with its profit-maximising status, Railtrack’s initial focus was 
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on shareholders and infrastructure expenditure was neglected. Maintenance and  renewals 
work was outsourced to 13 infrastructure companies, which employed extensive 
subcontracting and replaced experienced staff with untrained, or poorly trained, casual 
workers (Cole and Cooper, 2006, pp. 617-621). Moreover, despite the complexity of 
Railtrack’s infrastructure, there was no comprehensive asset register showing the 
network’s condition. This was vital for Railtrack had implemented “Project Destiny” 
which was developed by McKinsey. This was a complex risk-based maintenance system, 
which aimed to save money by assessing the network’s assets in order to maximise their 
use. Hence, assets would only be renewed when they became life-expired, rather than 
following the traditional policy undertaken by British Rail and other European railways 
of replacing assets at set time intervals. Heavily used points, for example, should have 
been “replaced more often than those on less busy routes” (Wolmar, 2005, pp. 170). 
The adverse and predictable consequences of this policy led by consultants, who 
were not recognised experts in rail services and management, were that Railtrack 
neglected what should have been its core function, the maintenance and renewal of the 
rail infrastructure. The network infrastructure was not given visibility in the new 
priorities and, as the NAO (2000, para. 17) forecast, there was a decline in the “health of 
the network”. This decline was tragically demonstrated by the Hatfield accident in 
October 2000, which resulted in four people being killed and 70 injured. Hatfield may be 
regarded as “the epitome of the failings” of rail privatisation (Wolmar, 2005, p. 156). The 
accident was caused by a faulty rail which had been discovered 21 months earlier, and 
earmarked for renewal, but not replaced because of Railtrack’s very poor management of 
contractors. Lacking an asset register, Railtrack was unable to establish whether there 
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were more broken rails in the system. Its alternative, which plunged the company into 
what proved to be a terminal crisis, was to introduce over 1,000 speed restrictions in an 
attempt to remedy the accumulated maintenance and renewals deficit (Jupe, 2009b, p. 
184).  In October 2001, faced with increasing demands for subsidy, Transport Secretary 
Byers obtained a court order placing an insolvent Railtrack in administration. 
The Labour Government rejected renationalisation, and protected the neoliberal 
core of the privatisation model by placing Railtrack in administration for one year 
(Wolmar, 2005, p. 213) and developing a replacement company. Network Rail, which 
replaced Railtrack in October 2002, was established as a not-for-dividend  “public 
interest company” limited by guarantee. It has members rather than shareholders and is 
financed by private debt rather than equity. Not surprisingly, private advisers contributed 
to Network Rail’s creation. One was Grayling, a senior research fellow at the Institute of 
Public Policy Research , who argued that an evolutionary approach was needed which 
both removed shareholder influence and avoided renationalisation (Grayling, 2001). 
Another influential figure was Shriti Vadera, a former investment banker, who was 
special adviser to the Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown (Wolmar, 2005, p. 
212).  
Network Rail’s combination of debt finance and large subsidy, the very 
weaknesses which British Rail was criticised for, has enabled significant increases in 
infrastructure expenditure. Under Railtrack’s stewardship, capital investment in the 
network was neglected in the first two years after privatisation, while the company 
focused on a profit-maximising agenda. British Rail’s capital investment had averaged 
£840 million per year in the pre-privatisation period 1988 to 1994 (Gourvish, 2004, p. 
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304), a figure which, unlike the infrastructure investment of its successor companies, was 
not inflated by the profit margins on outsourced contracts. After privatisation, as Table 2 
demonstrates, capital investment had declined to £484 million in 1996/97, increasing to 
only £599 million in 1997/98. 
  
    TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE 
 
6.2 Reduction of costs and subsidy  
The White Paper’s neoliberal rhetoric claimed that rail privatisation, by 
introducing competition and business efficiency, would “reduce costs” (Department of 
Transport, 1992, para. 19). Cost reductions were expected to eliminate public subsidy in 
the long run, and then to produce net payments to the government from TOC franchisees 
operating “profitable services” (Department of Transport, 1992, para. 21). In practice, 
however, privatisation led to a very substantial increase in both costs and subsidy. The 
key additional costs may be summarised as interface costs and cash leakages (Harris and 
Godward, 1997, p.107). Interface costs arise as a result of many companies being 
involved in a supply chain, which creates an upward pressure on prices as each company 
seeks surplus value in the form of profit. Cash leakages arise as interest payments and 
dividends are required to finance debt and equity respectively.    
The key interface costs introduced by privatisation were track access charges and 
leasing charges for trains. The two represented the bulk of the costs of the TOCs, and 
constituted most of the revenue of Railtrack and the ROSCOs respectively. These 
interface items alone added £3 billion per year to the costs of the privatised railway (Jupe, 
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2009a, p. 717). In addition, the outsourcing of Railtrack’s maintenance and renewals 
work meant it was necessary to reward layers of contractors. The dramatic increase in rail 
costs since privatisation can be demonstrated by comparing British Rail’s total operating 
costs before privatisation with those of the privatised railway. British Rail’s revenue in 
1993/94, the year before its reconstitution as an infrastructure provider, was £3.6 billion, 
which broadly equated with the £1.8 billion cost of running the infrastructure, along with 
the £1.8 billion cost of freight and passenger services (British Rail, 1993/94). In 
1999/2000, Railtrack’s costs of £2.4 billion were two thirds of British Rail’s costs of £3.6 
billion in 1993/94, but the company only had responsibility for half of its predecessor’s 
activities. By 2012/13, the comparable figure for the costs of the privatised infrastructure 
authority had risen to £5.5 billion. Hence, rail’s infrastructure costs have tripled since 
privatisation, with the key driver being substantial interface costs.   
 The substantial increase in infrastructure costs under Railtrack and then under its 
successor is revealed in Table 3.  
    TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE 
   
The consultants’ knowledge claims accepted that the TOCs would be subsidised 
after privatisation, but this subsidy, it was confidently predicted, would progressively 
decline and then be eliminated. In practice, the substantial cost increases mean that 
Network Rail has also been subsidised, alongside the TOCs. Table 4 shows the increased 
public support for the rail industry from 2001/2002.  This clearly exposed  the deceptive 
claims of the consultants that subsidies would be abolished in the long run with 
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privatisation, that the profit driven companies which would replace British Rail would 
operate more efficiently.  
    TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE  
In order to protect the TOCs, whose profitability even with subsidy was fragile,  
the track access charges were reduced to around £1.5 billion in most years and Network 
Rail became heavily dependent both on government grants and private debt. 
Privatisation’s introduction of private sector debt and equity produced huge cash 
leakages. Table 5 shows the increased cash leakages and debt of the infrastructure 
provider since privatisation.  
 
    TABLE FIVE ABOUT HERE 
The leakages of dividends and interest over the period 1994/1995 to 2012/2013 
totalled £10.2 billion. Railtrack distributed dividends totalling £709 million between 
1995/1996 and 2000/2001, equivalent to 41% of the total operating profits of £1.7 billion 
generated over the period. The most significant leakages, however, are interest payments 
which have risen by over £900 million since privatisation. This reflects the increase in  
debt of £28 billion since privatisation, reaching £30.4 billion by 2012/2013. The most 
significant increase in debt has occurred under Network Rail’s stewardship. Indeed, 
NetworkRail’s £3 billion increase in debt during 2012/2013 was greater than British 
Rail’s total borrowing of £2.5 billion in 1993/1994 to fund all aspects of its operations.  
Although Network Rail has brought maintenance work in-house, around 75% of 
infrastructure expenditure is still outsourced. The additional costs incurred by Network 
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Rail, arising from its private sector borrowing and outsourcing of renewals and 
enhancement expenditure, are summarised in Table 6. 
     
    TABLE SIX ABOUT HERE 
 
6.3 Maintain safety 
Safety, according to the 1992 White Paper, “would be maintained” across the 
privatised railway (Department of Transport, 1992, para. 76). Contrary to these blithe 
assurances, tragically privatisation in practice had very serious repercussions for the rail 
network as safety became subservient to the pursuit of profit. British Rail had been 
staffed by an integrated workforce which developed a “culture in which safety was 
nurtured as a habit of thought” (Terry, 2001, p. 5). Inspectors were employed by British 
Rail to cover all aspects of its work and major improvements in safety resulted from 
swiftly and uniformly applying lessons learned from accidents and through investment in 
new safety measures. There were fewer deaths in railway accidents in each successive 
postwar decade: from 344 deaths in the 1940s, to 337 in the 1950s, with a dramatic 
reduction to 95 in the 1980s, and just eight up to the year of rail’s privatisation in 1996 
(Wolmar, 2005, pp. 100-101).  
Tragically, this safety culture was splintered and weakened by privatisation. Four 
major fatal accidents between 1997 and 2002 originated in the “the industry’s 
fragmentation and the neglect of safety considerations between organisational 
boundaries” (Jupe and Crompton, 2006, p. 1060). In the Southall accident soon after 
privatisation in 1997, where seven people died and over 100 were injured, a Great 
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Western passenger train smashed into a goods train crossing its path in West London. The 
underlying cause of the accident was the passenger train’s non-functioning warning 
system, which had not been corrected at the maintenance depot which was badly 
managed and under-staffed following reorganisation demanded by the new private sector 
owners. The public inquiry found that this resulted in staff working under “more 
pressure” and a lack of attention to “safety-critical” details, problems compounded by the 
lack of co-ordination between Railtrack and Great Western trains over the reporting of 
faults in the train’s early warning system (Uff, 2000, pp. 64, 68 and 145). The more 
serious accident at Ladbrooke Grove in 1999, when 31 people died and 425 were injured, 
occurred when an inexperienced Thames Trains driver ignored a red light and crashed 
into another passenger train two miles out of Paddington station. The public inquiry 
criticised both the weak training programme of Thames Trains, which was 10 weeks 
shorter than British Rail’s, and Railtrack’s inadequate procedures for dealing with 
repeated Signals Passed at Danger incidents (Cullen, 2001, pp. 61, 129).  
The problems caused for safety in the fragmented rail industry were demonstrated 
most graphically by the train derailment near Hatfield, which has been discussed earlier. 
Although a huge effort was made to deal with the maintenance backlog after Hatfield, 
track maintenance problems were again highlighted in May 2002 by the fatalities at the 
Potters Bar derailment. A train from Potters Bar to King’s Lynn derailed at a set of points 
near Potters Bar, killing seven people and injuring 76. The accident investigation 
established that the points failed as they were “not fit for purpose” (Health and Safety 
Executive, 2003, p. 6). 
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Safety appears to have been given a higher priority under Network Rail and, as 
shown in Table 2, there has been a substantial increase in infrastructure expenditure. 
While the condition of the network generally has continued to improve, there was a 
serious train derailment at Grayrigg in Cumbria in 2007, when one person was killed and 
22 injured, arising from a faulty set of points (Jupe, 2009a, p. 729). 
  
6.4 Lead to higher quality of service 
Privatisation, according to the 1992 White Paper, would lead to “a higher quality 
of service” for passengers (Department of Transport, 1992, para. 1). This was a very 
optimistic claim as British Rail’s organisational reforms in the decade before privatisation 
had enabled it to cope with rising passenger demand, as the economy slowly recovered 
from the recession of the early 1980s, while improving the quality of service in the form 
of punctuality. The performance of InterCity trains improved steadily, with the proportion 
arriving on time increasing from 77% in 1986/1987 to 91% by 1993/1994, and the 
proportion of all trains arriving on time averaging  90% by 1993/1994 (Gourvish, 2002, 
p. 504). Under privatisation, as Table 7 reveals, overall punctuality declined initially from 
89.8% in 1997/98 to 87.8% in 1999/2000. 
    TABLE SEVEN ABOUT HERE 
 
This was followed by a striking fall in punctuality to 78% by 2001/2002, which 
arose primarily from the Hatfield crash in October 2000 and its aftermath. It has taken 
extensive infrastructure work, underpinned by billions of pounds in capital grants, to 
gradually return punctuality to the pre-privatisation level, and then to reach performance 
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levels of just over 90% from 2008/2009. There are still significant variations in 
performance, however, with long distance operators lagging behind the others. 
The foregoing analysis of four key privatisation knowledge claims has 
demonstrated the extent to which the claims were manufactured beliefs, co-produced by 
consultants with the client, the Conservative Government, “since consultant and client 
rely on each other” (Christensen and Skaerbaek, 2010, p. 543). The extent to which the 
claims were manufactured was exposed by Railtrack’s collapse, the escalation of rail’s 
costs and subsidy, and the safety and punctuality problems which arose. The consultants 
presented their knowledge claims with a missionary zeal, determined to act on neoliberal 
imperatives and setting aside any potential imperfections in the privatisation model, 
imperfections which had been highlighted by knowledgeable experts at British Rail. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the literature on both neoliberalism and the role of 
consultants in public sector reforms. The case of British Rail’s reform and privatisation 
demonstrates the extent to which the advocates of neoliberal ideology, including 
consultants and think tanks, have permeated the formulation of public policy in the 
British state. The belief that efficiency would be improved by separating infrastructure 
from operations, and fragmenting British Rail into 100 separate companies, relied heavily 
on neoliberal knowledge claims provided by consultants in purification attempts. 
Consultants made a very significant contribution to rail reform and then rail privatisation 
under the Thatcher and Major Governments “in the process by which networks of support 
develop around claims to expertise” (Gendron et al., 2007, p. 125). Their reports acted as 
key purification devices, legitimising disputed privatisation claims with the appearance of 
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“disinterested and rigorous” expertise (Gendron et al., 2007, p. 127), despite the very 
obvious, publicly known, conflicts of interest arising from bringing consultants into 
policy making. Senior partners of the firms from which the consultants were recruited by 
the Thatcher Government were also made members of the Serpell Committee, and 
consultants were later brought into the heart of both planning and implementing rail 
privatisation under the Major Government.   
    There were several reasons for the success of the consultants in promoting their 
controversial knowledge claims. The Major Government regarded British Rail’s 
opposition to the fragmentation and privatisation of the rail network as obstructive, and 
so British Rail was excluded from the policy-making arena and denied access to some of 
the consultancy reports. The Government then relied on skilled allies from consultancy 
firms to establish networks of support for rail privatisation. The consultants’ outputs were 
“co-produced” with their client, the Conservative Government, and so became “a 
powerful element of the resultant purification” (Chstistensen and Skaerbaek, 2010, p. 
531). The consultants were given crucial influence on policy-making by the initial tender 
documents whose visible agenda explicitly required consultants to report on how, rather 
than whether, British Rail should be privatised. Hence, “consultant and client” had to 
“rely on each other” (Christensen and  Skaerbaek, 2010, p. 543). Further, consultants 
were intimately linked with the client through important secondments. Sir Christopher 
Foster, senior partner with Coopers and Lybrand, prepared the 1992 White Paper in his 
capacity as special adviser to the Transport Secretary, and was later appointed a non-
executive director of Railtrack. Jim Butler, senior partner with KPMG, was appointed to 
British Rail’s Board to facilitate the privatisation process. 
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 The failures of rail privatisation which led to “deadly muddle and confusion” 
(Harvey, 2007, p. 67), resulting most notoriously in the worst rail crashes for several 
decades, have ensured that it is still very unpopular. The purification attempts and the 
perceived veracity of the consultants’ knowledge claims were so successful, however, 
that the Labour Government, elected in 1997, refused to consider Railtrack’s 
renationalisation, despite evidence that this would be well received by the public. A 
Guardian/ICM poll in October 1999, for example, which predated the company’s 
collapse by two years, revealed that over 70% of voters supported Railtrack’s 
renationalisation (Travis and Wells, 1999).  Railtrack’s collapse provided the Labour 
Government with the perfect opportunity to renationalise rail, but it chose to protect the 
neoliberal core of the privatisation model by reconstituting Railtrack as a “public interest 
company”,  Network Rail. Over a decade later, after a major review of the rail industry, 
the Labour Party reaffirmed its policy as the maintenance of the neoliberal core of the 
industry. It made one concession, that not-for-profit companies would be allowed to bid 
for rail franchises alongside for-profit companies (Topham, 2014).  
       The approach of protecting the neoliberal core from criticism is widespread in 
Britain.  Architects of rail privatisation, such as Steve Robson, have regularly attempted 
to protect the core of neoliberalism from criticism by classifying any problems as 
implementation flaws. A good example of this was given when he left the civil service, 
conceding in a newspaper interview that, although rail’s fragmentation and privatisation 
was right, “we probably broke it into too many pieces” (Fagan, 2000). Further, the rail 
regulator suggested that a solution to Network Rail’s increasing dependency on private 
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debt was a partial reprivatisation of the infrastructure in order to attract private 
investment (ORR, 2013a, para. 2.26).  
Consultants and think tanks provided expertise to justify both rail privatisation 
and the creation of Network Rail. Such expertise was supposedly delivered in the public 
interest rather than self-interest, but “expertise is always interested” and “produced to 
support the aims of some members of society” (Gendron et al., 2007, p. 127). Further, 
like Humphrey’s study of the role of consultants in the introduction of financial 
management to the British Probation Service, this paper “raises questions” as to the 
nature of the “claimed bases of expertise” of the consultants, which were often derived 
from “faithlike assertions” (1994, p. 171). In the case of rail privatisation, these “faithlike 
assertions” were grounded in neoliberalism and given credibility by accounting 
discourses. 
 Consultants, particularly the accountants, have used their expertise to play a 
crucial role in privatisations, both in Britain and around the world, which have benefited 
the private sector. Rail privatisation, particularly in the form of Network Rail, is, in 
practice, an expensive mechanism for channelling large amounts of public money to 
private companies (Jupe, 2009a, p. 731). Critical accounting research, as this paper and 
others have demonstrated, can be used to “evaluate public policy decisions in terms of  
the distribution of resources to different social groups” (Shaoul, 2005, p. 468), and to 
make visible the extent to which flawed policies such as rail privatisation resulted from 
dogmatic and excessive neoliberal public policy formulation. In this way, accounting can 
play an educative role in demonstrating the need for a much broader input into policy 
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formulation, including the possibility of a planned public transport system which is run in 
the public interest rather than for the benefit of private interests. 
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Multiple consultancies involved in rail privatisation       
Roles of Consultants     Consulting firms    
Advise on privatisation options   Coopers and Lybrand; Deloitte,  
       Haskins & Sells 
Advise on future structure of rail   Coopers and Lybrand; Deloitte,  
       Haskins & Sells; KPMG; Putnam 
       Hayes & Bartlett 
Advise on track access charges   Coopers and Lybrand; Putnam,  
       Hayes & Bartlett 
Advise on cost allocation    Coopers and Lybrand; Touche Ross 
Advise on accountancy and tax issues  KPMG 
Advise on accountancy issues   Ernst and Young; Deloitte & Touche 
BR board member to  
facilitate privatisation process   Jim Butler, KPMG 
Special adviser to Transport Secretary;  Sir Christopher Foster, Coopers and 
non-executive director of Railtrack   Lybrand 
Advise on sale of rolling stock companies  Price Waterhouse 
Advise on establishing Railtrack   McKinsey & Company 
Develop “Project Destiny” to reduce    
Railtrack’s network infrastructure costs  McKinsey & Company 
Recommend block signalling 
system  for Railtrack     Booz Allen & Hamilton 
Administrator for Railtrack after its 
collapse into insolvency    Ernst and Young 
             
 
Sources: Rail privatisation files at The National Archive (various years). 






Capital investment under Railtrack and Network Rail    
 




Year       £m 
 
1996/97        484 
1997/98        599 
1998/99      1,653 
1999/00      1,847 
2000/01      2,535 
2001/02      1,557 




Year       £m 
 
2002/03      1,654 
2003/04      3,858 
2004/05      3,598 
2005/06      3,151 
2006/07      3,326 
2007/08      3,952 
2008/09      4,743 
2009/10      3,920 
2010/11      3,997 
2011/12      4,600 
2012/13      5,050 
           
 
Notes: 1. The figures for Network Rail for 2002/03 are for a six month period. 
 2. Capital investment includes renewals and enhancement infrastructure 
      expenditure, all of which was outsourced to infrastructure companies  
    by both Railtrack and Network Rail. 
 
Sources: Audited Annual Report and Accounts of Railtrack and Network Rail.  
     Nominal values, unadjusted for inflation. 




Total costs and total revenue of Railtrack and Network Rail  from 1999/2000 to 
 2012/2013   
 
            
    Total revenue  Total costs Profit/(loss) 
    £m    £m  £m 




Year        
 
1999/00   2,547   2,389   158 
2000/01   2,476   2,921  (445)  
 2001/02   2,912   3,981            (1,069) 




Year        
 
2002/03   1,443   1,559  (116) 
2003/04   2,606   3,340  (734) 
2004/05   3,800   3,829   (29) 
2005/06   3,837   4,090  (253) 
2006/07   5,795   4,760  1,035 
2007/08   5,960   4,771  1,189 
2008/09   6,160   5,559    601 
2009/10   5,668   5,384    284 
2010/1 1   5,712   5,399    313 
2011/12   6,004   5,243    761 
2012/13   6,197   5,498    699 
            
Note: The figures for Network Rail for 2002/03 are for a six month period. 
Sources: Audited Annual Report and Accounts of Railtrack and Network Rail.  
    Nominal values, unadjusted for inflation. 





Government support for TOCs and Railtrack/Network Rail from 2001/2002 to      
2012/2013 
            
 
        Subsidies     Capital expenditure grants  Total 
        to TOCs   to Railtrack/Network Rail  support 
   £m         £m     £m 
            
 
Year  
2001/02 1,037           499   1,536 
2002/03 1,239           792   2,031 
2003/04 1,773        1,448   3,221 
2004/05 1,267        2,058   3,325 
2005/06 1,211        1,985   3,196 
2006/07 1,769        3,397   5,166 
2007/08 1,433        3,673   5,106 
2008/09   554        4,266   4,820 
2009/10   766        3,564   4,330 
2010/11          156        3,492   3,648 
2011/12     83        3,745   3,828 
2012/13  (256)        3,780   3,524 
            
Totals        11,032     32,699            43,731   
 
Note: The 2012/13 subsidies figure shows net payments by TOCs to government. 
 
Source: ORR Government support to the rail industry, 2013b, p. 1.  Nominal  
   values, unadjusted for inflation. 
 








 Rail debt and cash leakages before and after privatisation            
 
  Before privatisation BR reconstituted     After privatisation 
       1993/94 as infrastructure 
     company                 
     94/95 95/96   96/97  97/98  98/99    99/00   00/01   01/02  02/03  03/04  04/05      05/06   
    £m £m £m  £m  £m  £m  £m  £m  £m  £m  £m  £m  £m   
                             
Debt 
  BR    2,484 
  Railtrack    2,192 701 1,009 1,456 2,384 3,333 3,967 6,895 
  Railtrack/Network Rail                 9,744 
  Network Rail                        12,935    15,678   18,201 
                   
Interest payments 
   BR     121 
   Railtrack    141 181   39   40   81  132  150    318 
   Railtrack/Network Rail           361  
   Network Rail               428    505     669    
 
Dividends 
   BR 
   Railtrack      69  111  121  133  137  138 
   Network Rail 
                   
Total dividends and interest  121 141     250  150  161  214  269  288  318  361   428    505       669    
                   
Sources: Audited Annual Report and Accounts of British Rail, Railtrack and Network Rail. Nominal values, unadjusted for inflation. 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 Rail debt and cash leakages before and after privatisation            
 
           After privatisation 
       
                     
       06/07  07/08    08/09  09/10         10/11    11/12    12/13 
       £m     £m      £m     £m               £m       £m  £m 
                             
Debt 
  BR     
  Railtrack     
  Railtrack/Network Rail           
  Network Rail    18,415  19,760  22,319  23,847    25,049  27,282   30,358 
                   
Interest payments            Totals (£m) 
   BR                 121 
   Railtrack             1,082 
   Railtrack/Network Rail              361 
   Network Rail                  822     886     904     911         936     970        1,038  8,069      
 
Dividends 
   BR 
   Railtrack               709 
   Network Rail 
                   
Total dividends and  interest      822     886  904    911        936       970        1,038           10,342 
                   





Additional costs incurred by Network Rail in 2012/2013 arising from its private 
 sector status 
            
Additional costs       Amount   Sources 
         £m      
 
1. Outsourcing of renewals and enhancement  250  Network Rail (2013)  
   expenditure         
  
2. Private sector borrowing rates       692  Network Rail (2013) 
        Debt Management  
         Office (2013) 
3. Government charge for borrowing  
guarantee           200       ORR (2008) 
Total additional costs                1,142 
            
 
Notes: 1. Actual profit margin is confidential, so assumes 5% profit margin on  
               £5 billion of capital expenditure for 2012/13. 
 
 2. Interest expense for 2012/13 was £1,415 m charged on average debt for  
     year of £28,820 m, representing average rate of 4.9%. Government was  
     able to issue 10-year gilts at interest rates of 2.5% or lower in 2012/13.  
                Rate used here is 2.5%, so additional interest = 2.4%. 
 
 3. Planned charge of £1 billion spread over 5 years (ORR, 2008, p. 15). 
 
 
Sources:  Audited Annual Report and Accounts of Network Rail , 2013.   
               Debt Management Office, 2013, Gilt market. 
     ORR, 2008, Periodic review 2008. 
         









Public performance measure by sector: percentage of trains arriving on time 
 1997/98 to 2012/2013 
            
 
Year  Long distance   London and SE Regional All   
   operators   operators  operators    operators  
  %     %   %  % 
 
1997/98 81.7     89.5   90.8  89.8 
1998/99 80.6     87.9   88.6  87.9 
1999/00 83.7     87.1   89.1  87.8 
2000/01 69.1     77.6   81.7  79.1 
2001/02 70.2     77.8   79.1  78.0 
2002/03 76.6     78.9   80.5  79.2 
2003/04 73.4     80.3   82.9  81.2 
2004/05 79.2     84.7   82.6  83.6 
2005/06 82.2     87.9   85.0  86.4 
2006/07 84.9     88.8   87.6  88.1 
2007/08 86.2     90.6   89.6  89.9 
2008/09 87.3     91.0   90.6  90.6 
2009/10 88.8     91.4   92.0  91.4 
2010/11 87.8     91.0   91.1  90.8 
2011/12 89.2     91.7   92.0  91.6 
2012/13 87.1     91.0   91.6  90.9 
 
           
  
Note: Arriving “on time” is measured as arriving within 5 min of the published  
      timetable for London and the South East (SE) and regional operators and 
     arriving within 10 min of the published timetable for the long distance        
      operators 
 
Source: ORR Public Performance Measure by sector, 2013c. 
 












Appendix A.  List and meaning of abbreviations 
             
 
1. Rail organisations after privatisation 
 
 
ORR    The Office of the Rail Regulator (later, The Office of Rail  
    Regulation) 
ROSCOs   Rolling Stock Companies 
TOCs    Train Operating Companies 
 
2. Consulting firms 
 
DHS    Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, accountants 
PHB    Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett 
PMM    Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, accountants 
TM    R. Travers Morgan, engineers 
 
 
3. Public sector organisations and neoliberal-based policy 
 
MISC 94   Ministerial Committee which reviewed Serpell Report 
NAO    National Audit Office 
NPM    New Public Management 
  
 
4. Archive source 
 
TNA    The National Archive 
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